

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

NEA-10 NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15

TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 ACDA-19 OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01

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R 202120Z NOV 73  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2772  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USCINCEUR VAININGEN  
USNMR SHAPE  
USLO SACLANT  
USCINCLANT

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5599

E.O. 11652: GDS-12/31/81  
TAGS: PFOR, NATO  
SUBJECT: NPG-SUB-GROUG STUDY ON WARSAW PACT STRATEGY AND DOCTRINE

REF: USNATO 4966

1. MISSION HAS POUCHED ADDITIONAL MATERIAL ON SUBJECT STUDY  
CIRCULATED BY DUTCH ON 13 NOVEMBER WHICH CONTAINS, INTER  
ALIA, DUTCH DRAFT OF SECTION IV OF STUDY, "ADDITIONAL VIEWS  
ON SOVIET OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL THINKING."

ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON DUTCH DRAFT OF  
SECTION IV, IN ADDITION TO WASHINGTON COMMENTS REQUESTED IN  
REF TEL ON THE EARLIER DRAFT MATERIAL CIRCULATED BY DUTCH ON  
25 OCTOBER. COMMENTS SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO MISSION IN TIME  
FOR USE AT 27-28 NOVEMBER MEETING OF THE SUB-GROUP IN BRUSSELS.

2. CANADIAN COMMENTS ON THE DUTCH DRAFT OF SECTION I THRU  
III CIRCULATED ON 25 OCTOBER ARE PROVIDED BELOW:

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BEGIN TEXT:

1. ALTHOUGH WE MUST ACCEPT PART OF THE BLAME FOR NOT PRESS-  
ING AT AN EARLIER STAGE FOR FURTHER DEFINIATION OF A SPECIRIC

AIM OF STUDY WE ARE INCLUDED TO VIEW THE SCOPE OF STUDY, AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 5, AS BEING THE CAUSE FOR INCLUSION IN PART III OF SOME DEBATABLE ARGUMENTS WHICH ARE OF DOUBTFUL VALUE IN FULFILLING THE TASK SET OUT BY THE NPG. WE BELIEVE THAT THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY, AS REFLECTED IN PARAGRAPH5, EXCEEDS THE TASK LEVIED ON THE AD HOC TEAM AND CONSIDER THAT THE AIM FOR THE PAPER SHOULD BE MORE PRECISELY DEFINED THAN IS APPARENT IN THE MEANING OF THE FIRST SENTENCE OF PARAGRAPH 5. WE PROPOSE THAT THE AIM SHOULD BE: TO CONTRIBUTE TO A DEEPER UNDERSTANDING OF WPO POLITICO MILITARY DOCTRINE RELATIVE TO THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

2. FROM OUR UNDERSTANDING OF SOVIET DECISION MAKING PROCESS IN THE MILITARY FIELD, WE CONSIDER THAT THERE IS A CONFLICT IN TERMINOLOGY IN THE WORDING OF THE TASK LEVIED ON THE TEAM (STATED IN PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE STUDY) WHICH SHOULD, IF POSSIBLE, BE ELIMINATED IN THE TEXT IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING STATEMENT OF THE AIM. TO AVOID CONFUSION, WE WOULD PREFER THAT THE PHRASE "SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE" REPLACE THE PHRASE "WPO POLITICO MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE." EXPLANATION FOR THIS REFINEMENT OF THE TASK SHOULD BE MADE USING THE SOVIET DEFINITION OF MILITARY DOCTRINE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF THE STUDY. THIS WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IN SOVIET EYES, MILITARY DOCTRINE IS FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF THE STATE FOR ALL ASPECTS OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY IN PREPARATION OF THE USSR FOR THE EVENT OF WAR. THE EXPLANATION SHOULD ALSO NOTE THAT THE STUDY TEAM HAS NO MEANS OF KNOWING WHAT SOVIET POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY (I.E. SIMPLE STRATEGY)WOULD BE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WAR OR LEADING DIRECTLY TO OUTBREAK OF A WAR, WITH NATO,. THIS LATTER POINT WILL, WE THINK, PROVE HELPFUL AT A LATER STAGE IN THE STUDY.

3. COMMENT ON PART II. WE THINK THAT PART II SHOULD BE CLEARLY RECOGNIZABLE AS THE AGREED VIEWS OF THE AHIWG OF MC PUBLISHED ANNUALLY AS THE INTELLIGENCE BASIS FOR NATO MILITARY PLANNING. IN LINE WITH THIS APPROACH, WE BELIEVE

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THAT THE TEAM WOULD DO WELL IF IT WAS TO AVOID THA PITFALL OF ATTEMPTING TO ABRIDGE THE CAREFULLY FORMULATED ASSESSMENT BY THE AHIWG ON STRATEGIC MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS, THAT IS, THE 26 PARAGRAPHS OF PART I, SECTION 4 OF MC 161/73 WHICH ARE THEMSELVES A SUMMARY OF PERCEPTIONS OF THE NATO MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THE PROBLEM WE HAVE WITH THE DRAFT IS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN TAKEN VERBATIM FROM MC 161/73 PART I, SECTION 4 AND PART II, SECTION 4 (GROUND FORCES) BUT WITH WHAT HAS BEEN DELETED OR OMITTED. WE SUGGEST THAT THE SELECTIVE USE OF PARTS OF INTELLIGENCE JUDGEMENT, HOWEVER WELL INTENTIONED, CANNOT HELP BUT DISTORT THE INTELLIGENCE VIEW AND DESTROY THE BALANCE OF ASSESSMENT. WE THINK THAT BY INADVERTENTLY SHADING MEANINGS OF SO CALLED OFFICIAL NATO VIEWS WITHOUT CLEARLY DEFINING THE CAUSE FOR CHANGE AND

PERTINENT EVIDENCE, THE STUDY TEAM IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO CONFUSE THE ISSUE MORE THAN IT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A BETTER UNDERSTANDING ON THE PART OF MINISTERS. WE HAVE IN MIND A COMPROMISE AND SUGGEST THAT THE STUDY TEAM DRAW ITS OWN CONCLUSIONS FROM PART, SECTION 4, PLACE THEM IN THE MAIN BODY OF THE PAPER, AND ATTACH PART I, SECTION 4 OF MC 161/73 AS A COSMIC TOP SECRET ANNEX TO THE STUDY. THIS SHOULD AVOID THE DANGER OF SERIOUS CONTROVERSY LATER. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THESE CONCLUSIONS, BUT STILL IN PART II, WE THINK THAT THERE SHOULD BE ROOM TO DRAW UPON VIEWS OF SOME EMINENT AUTHORITIES, ON THE RELEVANCE OF DETERRENCE TO OUR PROBLEM, THAT IS, IN THE GRIFEST OF TERMS, REFLECT HOW DETERRENCE WHICH IS THE CORNERSTONE OF NATO POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY, CONCEIVABLY MIGHT FAIL IN FUTURE. WE NOTE THAT HELMUT SCHMIDT IN HIS BOOK "BALANCE OF POWER" PRINTED IN GERMAN IN 1969 AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH IN 1971 DEALS WITH THIS ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM IN AN INTERESTING FASHION. WE THINK THAT SUCH A DISCUSSION WILL PROVE USEFUL IN AVOIDING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE STUDY, WHICH MUST ASSUME THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR IN ORDER TO DEVELOP IDEAS OF HOW THE SOVIETS MIGHT EMPLOY NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MC 161/73 WHICH CONCLUDES THAT WAR IS NOT LIKELY. THIS APPROACH SHOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IN FRAMING CONCLUSIONS AT THE END OF THE STUDY.

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 NSC-10 CIAE-00 PM-07 INR-10 L-03

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TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OMB-01 ACDA-19 OIC-04 AEC-11 DRC-01

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R 202120Z NOV 73  
FM USMISSION NATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2773  
SECDEF WASHDC  
INFO USCINCEUR VAININGEN  
USNMR SHAPE  
USLO SACLANT  
USCINCLANT

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4. FOLLOWING PART II IT WOULD SEEM APPROPRIATE FOR THE STUDY TEAM TO DEVELOP SOMETHING ON THE BACKGROUND OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WAR DOCTRINE. IN THIS PART IT WOULD BE QUITE

REASONABLE TO WORK IN IDEAS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 18 TO 24 INCLUSIVE OF THE PRESENT DRAFT. WE HAVE ALREADY OFFERED TO NETHERLANDS CHAIRMAN, OUR VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT AND ALTHOUGH IN NO WAY WEDDED TO THE TEXT OF OUR PAPER, WE DO BELIEVE THAT AN APPROACH ALONG THE GENERAL LINES WE HAVE SUGGESTED WILL CONTRIBUTE TO IMISTERS GRASP OF PROBLEMS OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR USE AND MIGHT PROVE HELPFUL TO OUR OWN UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE VIEWS. IT WOULD THEN FOLLOW LOGICALLY TO INCLUDE A SECTION ON SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR DCAPABILITIES. WE REALIZE THAT THIS SUGGESTION WAS MADE AT AN EARLIER MEETING BUT WAS SUBSEQUENTLY DROPPED. HOWEVER, AS THE NATURE OF SOVIET TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS A DIRECT BEARING ON THE OPTIIONS AVAILABLE TO THEM, WE CONSIDER THIS TO BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR WHICH SHOULD, THEREFORE, BE INCLUDED.

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5. WITH RESPECT TO PART III OF THE PAPER WE HAVE SOME QUESTIONS TO RAISE ON SPECIVIC PARAGRAPHS:

(A) PARAGRAPH 31. IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT DETERENCE WILL FAIL IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT SOVIETS MUST VIEW AS BEING THEIR SUPERIORITY IN CONVENTIONAL ARMS WOULD THEY NOT BE MORE LIKELY TO OPT FOR A LESS SUICIDAL COURSE?

(B) PARAGRAPH 32. CAN IT " BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED" THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GIVE MORE THAN PASSING ATTENTION TO THE VIEWS OF WPO COUNTRIES WHEN MAKING ULTIMATE DECISIONS ON THE USE FO NUCLEAR WEAPONS? WE FIND THE LAST PART OF THIS PARAGRAPH DIFFICULT TO FOLLOW. IF WE ASSUME THAT NATO WILL NOT START A WAR, WOULD IT NOT BE FOUGHT ON NATO AND NOT WPO TERRITORY?

PARAGRAPH 33. WHILE WE ACKNOWLEDGE SOVIET CONCERN FOR THEIR OWN PEOPLE WE WONDER, EXCEPT IN THE SENSE OF EFFECT OF A RETALIATORY NATO STRIKE, WHETHER MUCH CONCERN WOULD BE FELT FOR THE ENEMY PROLETARIAT.

(C) PARAGRAPH 35. THE CONCLUSION DEALS WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOUR IN A CRISIS SHORT OF WAR WHEREAS THE STUDY MUST ASSUME A WAR SETTING. WE WONDER, THEREFORE, WHETHER THIS DISCUSSION IS RELEVANT UNLESS ONE CAN PROJECT TO THE NUCLEAR WAR ENVIRON- MENT WELL KNOWN SOVIET PROCLIVITY FOR MASSIVE PREPARATIONS TO ENSURE SUCCESS THUS REDUCING TO A MINIMUM RISKS ATTNNDANT IN ANY OPERATION.

PARAGRAPHS 36-38. AGAIN THESE PARAGRAPHS SUGGEST SOVIET POSTURES IN SITUATIONS SHORT OF WAR. WE SEE A TENDENCY TO BE DRAWN ITO THIS SORT OF DISCUSSION AS STEMMING FROM THE LACK OF DEFINITIVE AIM. (PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE).

6. FINAL COMMENTS WILL HAVE TO AWAIT PUBLICATION OF

PART IV OF THE STUDY. END TEXT.

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